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[The following article on the crisis in Haiti was written by Bess Abrahams and Elizabeth ChanceWeigel from the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). The article is
reproduced with COHA's permission.] The military-initiated violence that has been visited on
supporters of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, and the obstructionism engaged in by the Haitian
military in preventing the landing of US and Canadian military engineers, emphasizes the glaring
inadequacies of the Governors Island Accord. That pact's inherent weakness was that it reinforced
the island's military regime by placing it on equal footing with the ousted Aristide. This is not
exactly a random occurrence, since his populist brand of democracy, which met with a frosty
reception in the Bush White House, has hardly fared better under Clinton. The administration
has always appeared to appreciate the idea of Aristide far more than his corporeal reality. The
illogicality of the Clinton strategy of restoring democracy through the same channels which
destroyed it is best exemplified by the military's continued use of terror to eliminate opposing
voices, which has claimed at least 3,500 lives in its two years of rule. The regime, headed by Lt. Gen.
Raoul Cedras and abetted by the powerful police chief Col. Michel Francois, has been intent on
provoking chaos as the time neared for Aristide to return on Oct. 30. Their hidden mission is likely
to demonstrate that the just-installed pro-Aristide transition team can govern only in collaboration
with an institution that has no intention of closing down its multi-hundred million dollar drug
trafficking operation or discontinuing its chronic use of violence to control the population. Now
that the first of some 1,500 UN personnel, almost half of whom will be Americans, have tried and
failed to arrive in Haiti to retrain the military and get the country running, it could be instructive
to examine the pot-holed trail of US-Haitian relations so that the international community can
best assist this beleaguered nation by not compounding avoidable mistakes. When they first met,
Clinton expressed support for Aristide's return to power, but continued ineffective Bush policies,
authored by its regional policy maker, Bernard Aronson, that failed to ease the military's chokehold on the country. Criticism mounted that the new administration's diplomatic initiatives toward
Haiti which continued under Aronson's direction as a temporary Bush holdover were too protracted,
if not inept, as well as too solicitous of the military's fate. A senior US official responded to this
by defending Washington and insisting that the armed forces "must be coaxed into accepting
democracy by a series of carrot-and-stick maneuvers that take a lot of time to implement." Early this
summer, the White House belatedly decided to crack down on the military, which resulted in last
July's UN oil embargo and arrangements for the Governors Island meeting. The UN, also worrying
over its eclipsing image, threatened to end its Haitian diplomatic efforts as the military repeatedly
stonewalled on its pledges to its ineffectual negotiator, Dante Caputo. Fearing the high political cost
of failure, Washington increased the pressure on Aristide, the military, and Caputo. The series of
talks which led to the accord resulted mainly from concessions by Aristide, and what turned out to
be the largely paper gestures by Lt. Gen. Cedras. The Haitian military won Washington's backing
for an amnesty in spite of the thousands of innocent civilians who died at its hands. In order to
extort Aristide's signature, negotiators indicated that they were prepared to lift the embargo even if
he failed to cooperate. All along it had been the State Department's modus operandi to suggest that
it was Aristide's intransigence as much as anything that was holding up a settlement. But Aristide
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well knew what Washington all along refused to acknowledge: that for democracy to be achieved,
the military must be defanged, rather than forgiven and reformed. Despite Washington's insistence
that Aristide will be installed on schedule, this now seems problematic. The UN force, even if it
fully manages to arrive, particularly after the bitter lessons of Somalia, will have to carry out its brief
six-month mission in a hands-off manner. It is not empowered to arrest, detain, or protect only to
observe, train and construct. Even if casualties begin to mount among UN personnel as a result of
the activities of Francois' brutal plainclothes "attaches," it is unlikely that the UN will grant a wider
mandate. As for the restored embargo, Washington well knew that contraband smuggling thrives
along Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic, but has been entirely mute on the subject as it
has been over the military's massive involvement in drug smuggling. Although the hundreds of
incoming foreign officers and specialists are bound to improve matters, it would be foolhardy to
believe that democracy can be consolidated in an environment where the Haitian military know that
once the foreigners leave and the country is no longer in the international spotlight, its full leverage
will return. While the Clinton administration may have bought time with its calamitous Haiti policy,
the respite may prove very short-lived, because what was needed there was not a cosmetically
improved military, but its elimination in the presence of regional peacekeepers who would, for the
first time, also guarantee real democratic options to the long suffering population.

-- End --
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